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NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 
AND AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS: SEEKING 
AN EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK IN A NEW ERA OF HEALTH 
AND DEVELOPMENT AID 
Chandler H. Udo* 
Abstract: International and domestic nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) have multiplied on the African continent as both public and pri-
vate donors have shifted their funding away from ineffective governments. 
Many African nations, including Zimbabwe and Sudan, have responded by 
expelling international NGOs and enacting laws that severely limit their 
ability to function. In most cases, NGOs are without recourse because of 
their precarious position in international law. Some scholars have posited 
that NGOs should be granted legal personality to make them full or partial 
subjects in international law. This Note argues that such a solution would 
not promote the important goals NGOs advance in Africa. It would also ig-
nore the important role that African governments must play in health and 
development issues. Instead, the international community should reinforce 
the existing international legal framework, allow NGOs to remain inde-
pendent, and create mechanisms to foster communication between NGOs 
and host governments. 
Introduction 
 In 2005, the Government of Sudan took a number of steps to re-
move international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that were 
operating within its borders.1 These official acts included sending a let-
ter of warning to the charity Oxfam and arresting two Médicins Sans 
Frontiéres (Doctors Without Borders) workers who had recently re-
                                                                                                                      
* Chandler H. Udo is a Note Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative 
Law Review. The author would like to thank his dearest friend, Kyle Hogan, for her unwav-
ering support. 
1 See Cris Chinaka, NGOs Tiptoe Through Africa’s Political Minefields, Global Pol’y F., Oct. 
11, 2005, http://globalpolicy.org/ngos/state/2005/1011tiptoe.htm. Other African nations 
have taken similar steps to remove international NGOs, which are seen as agents of Western 
Governments. Eritrea, for example, recently told the U.S. Agency for International Devel-
opment to cease their operations within that country. See id. 
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ported a rape in the Darfur region of Sudan.2 Such acts of expulsion, 
in addition to similar incidents that occur throughout the African con-
tinent, highlight the precarious position of international NGOs relative 
to the power of the nation state.3 According to a proponent of NGOs in 
Zimbabwe, “Although NGOs are very important in advancing eco-
nomic and social development and in alleviating poverty and hunger, 
some governments regard them as part and parcel of Western powers 
they have problems with.”4 
 The problem of uncooperative host states in Africa is not a new 
phenomenon, as many donor governments across the globe, and or-
ganizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank, have argued that misrule has kept Africa from attaining signifi-
cant economic and political development.5 In the 1980s and 1990s, 
wealthy nations primarily channeled development assistance through 
the IMF and World Bank, who would recommended disastrous struc-
tural adjustment policies for the continent.6 As a result of these poli-
cies, many African nations accumulated enormous amounts of debt.7 
The failure of these policies left many Western leaders skeptical of the 
efficacy of African governments, and thus official development assis-
tance (ODA) has diminished over time.8 
 An important change has occurred in recent years in the funda-
mental approach to assisting the plight of needy Africans.9 Donor gov-
ernments have been electing to channel foreign aid to NGOs rather 
                                                                                                                      
2 See id. Oxfam describes itself as an international development and relief organization 
that seeks to alleviate poverty and suffering around the world. See Oxfam Int’l, http://www. 
oxfam.org.uk/about_us/index.htm (last visited May 19, 2008). 
3 See Chinaka, supra note 1. 
4 Id. 
5 See Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for our Time 
188–89 (2005). 
6 See id. at 189. 
7 See id. The Catholic Church led a movement at the turn of the century dubbed “Jubilee 
2000,” which aimed to eliminate all third world debt by the year 2000 to correspond with the 
Great Jubilee celebration of the Catholic Church. See Jubilee Debt Campaign, http://www. 
jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/?lid=282 (last visited May 19, 2008). Many governments re-
sponded to this call, including the United States, which pledged to forgive $435 million of 
foreign debt in 2000. See Christopher Wilson, US House Approves Third World Debt Relief, CNN, 
Oct. 25, 2000, available at http://archives.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/10/25/ 
congress.aid.reut/index.html. 
8 See Sam Chege, Donors Shift More Aid to NGOs: But Cooperation Between Governments and 
NGOs Is Critical for Greater Effectiveness, Afr. Recovery, Vol. 13, June 1999, available at 
http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/subjindx/131ngo.htm. 
9 See id. 
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than African governments they largely view to be corrupt.10 Simultane-
ously, individuals, corporations, and foundations have increased their 
giving by astronomical proportions.11 For example, the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation (Gates Foundation) alone has given over $6.6 billion 
to global health and development programs.12 The coffers of the Gates 
Foundation were more than doubled in the past year when Warren 
Buffet pledged thirty-seven billion dollars to the charity.13 
 Thousands of NGOs and humanitarian organizations have quickly 
responded to the influx of available funds and are looking to spend the 
money.14 Similarly, donors are seeking ways to distribute their aid effi-
ciently and effectively.15 The Gates Foundation is looking for projects 
that “collaborate with government, philanthropic, private-sector, and 
not-for-profit employers.”16 
 A substantial amount of scholarly literature has been devoted to 
the issue of NGOs in international law.17 This inquiry is of particular 
importance now that international and local NGOs serve as the pri-
mary conduit for foreign aid in Africa.18 This Note seeks to add to this 
discussion by assessing the ways international legal rules can respond to 
the new reality of African aid-delivery, which involves partnerships in-
volving many different actors. 
 Part I of this Note outlines the evolving role of NGOs in Africa, the 
emergence of local NGOs, and the reasons why African governments 
have problems with foreign assistance in general. Part II explores vari-
                                                                                                                      
10 See id. In fact, the World Bank reported that NGOs in Africa were handling $3.5 bil-
lion in foreign aid in 1999, compared to less than $1 billion in 1990. See id. 
11 See Laurie Garrett, The Challenge of Global Health, Foreign Aff., Jan./Feb. 2007, available 
at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86103/laurie-garrett/the-challenge-of-
global-health.html. 
12 Id. 
13 Buffet Donates $37 Billion to Charity, BBC News, June 26, 2006, available at http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5115920.stm. 
14 See Garrett, supra note 11. 
15 See The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, For Grant Seekers, http://www.gates 
foundation.org/ForGrantSeekers (last visited May 19, 2008) [hereinafter For Grant Seek-
ers]. 
16 Id. 
17 See, e.g., Gregory W. MacKenzie, Note, ICSID Arbitration as a Strategy for Levelling the 
Playing Field Between International Non-Governmental Organizations and Host States, 19 Syra-
cuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 197 (1993) (arguing that the International Center for the Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes (ICSID) would be a desirable option for the settlement of 
disputes between states and international NGOs); Karsten Nowrot, Legal Consequences of 
Globalization: The Status of Non-Governmental Organizations Under International Law, 6 Ind. J. 
Global Legal Stud. 579 (1999) (arguing that legal status of NGOs should reflect their 
actual participation in international affairs). 
18 See generally Chege, supra note 8. 
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ous legal doctrines within international law as they pertain to interna-
tional organizations and international NGOs, as well as presenting a 
sample of African laws addressing NGOs. Part III argues that popular 
theories of NGOs in international law would not be conducive to foster-
ing more effective aid delivery in Africa. Rather, what is needed is for 
NGOs to remain independent, rely on their moral legitimacy, and en-
gage in more effective communication. 
I. Background 
 Although NGOs are numerous and influential today, many scholars 
contend they did not become an integral part of the international sys-
tem until the creation of the United Nations (U.N.).19 One commenta-
tor has defined international NGOs as “groups of persons or of societies, 
freely created by private initiative, that pursue an interest in matters that 
cross or transcend national borders and are not profit seeking.”20 NGOs 
that operate in Africa serve a variety of goals, including offering relief 
services during times of natural disaster, promoting environmental con-
servation, fostering development, and promoting human rights.21 In-
ternational NGOs have experienced considerable growth in recent years 
as countries have elected to funnel their money directly to international 
NGOs as opposed to going through state governments.22 The interna-
tional community considered NGOs to be more accountable and better 
able to address local development conditions.23 Major financial institu-
tions, including the World Bank, have backed the rise of NGOs.24 
 The increasing prominence of international NGOs does not mean 
that intergovernmental organizations (IOs) are no longer major play-
ers in African aid-delivery.25 For example, the World Health Organiza-
                                                                                                                      
19 See Nowrot, supra note 17, at 581. 
20 Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, 100 Am. J. 
Int’l L. 348, 350 (2006). 
21 See NGOs Achievers or Deceivers? Hundreds of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) Op-
erate in Various African Countries, BBC News, Feb. 20, 2004, available at http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/2/hi/africa/3502733.stm. 
22 See MacKenzie, supra note 17, at 205. 
23 Raymond C. Offenheiser, Enhancing NGO Effectiveness in Africa: Re-Evaluating the Po-
tential for Genuine Partnerships 7 (Oxfam America, Working Paper No. 4, 1999), available at 
http://www.oxfamamerica.org/newsandpublications/publications/ideas_at_oxfam/art50
70.html/OA-Working_Paper_4.pdf. 
24 Id. 
25 See generally U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. for Programme and Coor-
dination, U.N. System Support for the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, U.N. Doc. 
E/AC.51/2006/6 (Mar. 29, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/reports/ 
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tion (WHO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) are 
still considerable actors in Africa.26 The WHO spends nearly thirty per-
cent of its operating budget in Africa for programs such as health care 
improvement, AIDS prevention, malaria prevention, child death reduc-
tion, and maternal health promotion.27 Furthermore, many U.N. agen-
cies frequently collaborate with NGOs to achieve shared objectives.28 
The WHO recently joined forces with the Malaria Consortium, Doctors 
Without Borders, and Medical Emergency Relief International to com-
bat the pervasive problem of malaria in Africa.29 A representative of the 
group stated, “Institutions are prone to slowness. We need NGOs to 
generate speed and action.”30 Similarly, the FAO asserted that, “Work-
ing with [civil society organizations] enables the FAO to increase the 
effectiveness and quality of its work in agriculture and in the fight 
against hunger.”31 These examples highlight the changing nature of 
development assistance in Africa, which involves collaboration between 
multiple types of actors.32 
A. From Official Development Assistance to Multi-Faceted Partnerships 
 Statistics show that, although aid has increased overall, there has 
been a shift from ODA given to governments toward direct funding of 
                                                                                                                      
CPC%20Report%202006%20.pdf (outlining how U.N. agencies have contributed to the 
New Partnership For Africa’s Development). 
26 See id. 
27 See generally World Health Org. (WHO), Working For Health, An Introduc-
tion to the World Health Organization (2007), available at http://www.who.int/ 
about/brochure_en.pdf (providing a basic overview of WHO’s expenditures, programs, 
and strategies). 
28 See WHO, Principles for Governing Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations, avail-
able at http://www.who.int/civilsociety/relations/principles/en/index.html. According to 
the WHO, “The objectives of WHO’s collaboration with NGOs are to promote the policies, 
strategies and programmes derived from the decisions of the Organization’s governing 
bodies; to collaborate with regard to various WHO programmes in jointly agreed activities 
to implement these strategies; and to play an appropriate role in ensuring the harmoniz-
ing of intersectoral interests among the various sectoral bodies concerned in a country, 
regional or global setting.” Id. 
29 See WHO, WHO and Civil Society: Linking Together For Better Health 11 
(2002), available at http://www.who.int/civilsociety/documents/en/CSICaseStudyE.pdf. 
30 Id. The Civil Society Initiative governs the relationship between the WHO and non-
governmental organizations. See WHO, The Civil Society Initiative http://www.who.int/ 
civilsociety/en (last visited May 19, 2008). 
31 FAO, Cooperation with Civil Society, http://www.fao.org/tc/NGO/index_en.asp (last 
visited May 19, 2008). 
32 See id. 
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international NGOs.33 This phenomenon resulted from concern that 
many governments were seen to be untrustworthy and ineffective at dis-
tributing aid.34 In fact, the U.N. has called for a “new humanitarian or-
der” that incorporates efforts by states, NGOs, and IOs to cooperate in 
the humanitarian field.35 The amount of money devoted to NGOs has 
reached astronomical levels over the past several years.36 This reality can 
be partially attributed to more funding provided by states, but it is pri-
marily the result of the emergence of new donors in the private sector 
that have committed to expending large sums of money in support of 
health and development.37 It is important to consider these actors, in-
cluding the largest of them all, the Gates Foundation, because they will 
be key components of future African development.38 
1. The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation: A New Donor 
 The Gates Foundation was formed in 2001 by the richest man in 
the world, Bill Gates, and his wife, Melinda.39 The current endowment 
of the organization is thirty-three billion dollars with approximately 
thirty-seven billion more being provided by a donation by Warren Buf-
fet.40 The Gates Foundation focuses on global development, global 
health, and the U.S. educational system.41 This enormous stockpile of 
                                                                                                                      
33 See Chege, supra note 8; OECD, More Effort Needed to Reach Foriegn Aid Targets, Says 
OECD Report, http://www.oecd.org/document/38/0,2340,en_2649_201185_38144422_1_ 
1_1_1,00.html (last visited May 19, 2008). 
34 See Offenheiser, supra note 23, at 12. A reflection of the frustration over wasted for-
eign aid was expressed by former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Paul O’Neill, who said, 
“We’ve spent trillions of dollars on these problems and we have damn near nothing to 
show for it.” See Sachs, supra note 5, at 310. 
35 MacKenzie, supra note 17, at 206. 
36 See David Brown, Gates Foundation Giving $500 Million to Fight Disease, Wash. Post, 
Aug. 10, 2006, at A15. On August 9, 2006, The Gates Foundation announced that it would 
give $500 million dollars to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, an 
international NGO that provides financial support for developing countries to fight those 
three diseases. See id. 
37 See id.; OECD, supra note 33. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD) reports that donors have increased their funding for aid programs 
faster than any other public expenditure to fulfill their commitments to double aid to 
Africa by 2010. The report also notes, however, that funding levels will have to be increased 
significantly to meet the stated targets. See id. 
38 See Brown, supra note 36. 
39 See Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Foundation Fact Sheet, http://www.gates 
foundation.org/MediaCenter/FactSheet/default.htm (last visited May 19, 2008) [herein-
after Fact Sheet]. 
40 See id.; Buffet Donates $37 Billion to Charity, supra note 13. 
41 See Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, supra note 39. According to the Foundation’s 
website, the organization focuses on “improving health, reducing extreme poverty, and 
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financial resources, in addition to the organization’s past grants, has 
ensured the Gates Foundation will play a leading role in the future of 
aid-delivery in Africa.42 The Gates have publicly committed to spending 
all of their assets within fifty years of their death so they can focus on 
making substantial progress in the twenty-first century.43 
 The organization works with partners consisting of local and in-
ternational NGOs.44 For example, past grants made by the Gates Foun-
dation include: $500 million to The Global Fund to Fight Aids; $1.5 
billion to the GAVI Alliance, an organization providing vaccinations for 
hepatitis and yellow fever; and $110 Million to Save the Children’s Sav-
ing Newborn Lives.45 As previously mentioned, the Gates Foundation is 
looking for causes and grantees that focus on forging meaningful alli-
ances among various types of donees.46 
2. International NGO Sampler 
 Oxfam International and Doctors Without Borders are two exam-
ples of major international NGOs playing a significant role in develop-
ment- and health-related issues in Africa.47 Oxfam pursues a three-
pronged approach to alleviating poverty around the world by: provid-
ing support during emergencies; developing solutions for people to 
work their way out of poverty; and campaigning to achieve lasting 
change.48 To achieve these objectives, Oxfam works in numerous areas 
including: debt and aid; natural disasters; health; and improving peo-
ple’s livelihoods.49 Oxfam’s enormous impact in Africa is illustrated by 
                                                                                                                      
increasing access to technology in public libraries. In the United States, the foundation 
seeks to ensure that all people have access to a great education . . . .” Id. 
42 See id. 
43 See Sally Beatty, Gates Foundation Sets Time Frame to Spend Assets, Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 
2006, at A10. The foundation said the move was a decision by its three trustees to do “as 
much as possible, as soon as possible” to further its work. Id. 
44 See Carol J. Loomis, The Global Force Called the Gates Foundation, Fortune, June 25, 2006, 
available at http://money.cnn.com/2006/06/25/magazines/fortune/charity4.fortune/in-
dex.htm. 
45 See Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Global Health Grantee Progress 1 
(2007), available at http://www.gatesfoundation.org/nr/downloads/globalhealth/Grantee_ 
progress.pdf. 
46 See For Grant Seekers, supra note 15. 
47 See Doctors Without Borders/Médicins Sans Frontiéres, http://www.doc-
torswithoutborders.org (last visited May 19, 2008); Oxfam Int’l, supra note 2. 
48 Oxfam Int’l, Mission Possible: Ending Poverty, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/oxfam_in_ 
action/what_we_do/index.html (last visited May 19, 2008). 
49 See Oxfam Int’l, What We Do, http://www.oxfam.org/en/about/what (last visited 
May 19, 2008). 
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the £213 million of funds available to that organization, much of which 
comes from government and private donors.50 
 Similarly, Doctors Without Borders describes itself as “an inde-
pendent international medical humanitarian organization that delivers 
emergency aid to people affected by armed conflict, epidemics, natural 
or man-made disasters, or exclusion from health care in more than 
[seventy] countries.”51 The medical and non-medical experts that make 
up that organization engage in approximately 4700 field assignments 
annually.52 In addition to offering medical care during times of disaster, 
Doctors Without Borders also provides long-term medical care for dis-
eases such as HIV/AIDS, sleeping sickness, and tuberculosis.53 Like Ox-
fam, a vast majority of its funding comes from individuals, corporations, 
and foundations.54 
B. African NGOs: The Local Solution 
 Recent years have witnessed the incredible proliferation of local 
NGOs in Africa that serve to fill the vacuum for services left by local 
and national governments.55 For instance, the tiny African nation of 
Ghana has recently reported as many as 3000 NGOs operating within 
that country.56 The major growth of local African NGOs can be partially 
explained by the increased willingness of international and bilateral aid 
agencies to contract with local groups to do their groundwork.57 It 
might also be partially explained by the sheer volume of funds available 
from donor countries and private organizations.58 Thus, “The promo-
tion of NGOs as leaders in humanitarianism has created a land rush 
                                                                                                                      
50 See Oxfam Int’l, Annual Report & Accounts 22 (2006–07), available at http:// 
www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/downloads/reports/report_accounts06_7.pdf. 
51 Doctors Without Borders, About Us, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/aboutus/ 
index.cfm (last visited May 19, 2008). 
52 Id. 
53 See id. 
54 See Doctors Without Borders, Annual Financial Report 32–45 (2005), avail-
able at http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/ar/us2005.pdf. 
55 See Iliasu Adam, Ghana to Blacklist NGOs, BBC News, Feb. 25, 2004, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3517827.stm. 
56 Id. The prolific nature of NGOs in Africa is illustrated by South Africa, where some 
50,000 NGOs currently operate. Chege, supra note 8. 
57 See Adam, supra note 55. The President of Oxfam claimed, “Many large interna-
tional NGOs have become the equivalent of bilateral NGO subcontracting agencies.” Of-
fenheiser, supra note 23, at 7. 
58 See Garrett, supra note 11. 
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atmosphere and prompted the launching of many new humanitarian 
groups competing for the humanitarian donor dollar.”59 
 African governments have become frustrated by their lack of con-
trol over both local and international NGOs operating within their bor-
ders.60 Ministries of health in African countries are concerned with their 
ability to track operations of foreign organizations, avoid duplication of 
resources, and ensure that the services provided match their own priori-
ties.61 International NGOs have been criticized for their failure to evalu-
ate and monitor, and African NGOs are viewed as lacking “competen-
cies, professionalism, legitimacy, and [as being prone to] cronyism.”62 
Finally, African governments are particularly concerned that Western-
backed international NGOs are “trojan horses,” there to diminish their 
sovereign authority and promote a Western agenda.63 
II. Discussion 
 In international law, different actors possess express rights and ob-
ligations depending on their fundamental characteristics.64 These dif-
ferences are crucial in the context of aid and development assistance in 
Africa because they dictate how such actors behave toward one an-
other.65 First, a state, as sovereign, is allowed to make, enforce, and ad-
judicate domestic laws within its territory.66 In other words, “[S]ov-
ereignty could be considered a form of absolute domestic jurisdiction— 
the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures 
within a given territory.”67 Local African NGOs must therefore adhere 
to the legal rules laid down by their national government, even if such 
laws appear significantly to restrict their ability to carry out their stated 
goals.68 Similarly, it is crucial to distinguish IOs and international NGOs 
because their legal status is very different in international law.69 
                                                                                                                      
59 See Offenheiser, supra note 23, at 5–6. 
60 See Garrett, supra note 11. 
61 Id. The U.S. government has been accused of exerting too much control over the 
design and priorities of AIDS programs in Africa. See id. 
62 Offenheiser, supra note 23, at 12. 
63 See Chinaka, supra note 1. 
64 See Mark Janis, An Introduction to International Law 185 (2003). 
65 See id.; Chinaka, supra note 1. 
66 Janis, supra note 64, at 192; Chinaka, supra note 1. 
67 Duncan B. Hollis, Private Actors in Public International Law: Amicus Curiae and the Case 
for the Retention of State Sovereignty, 25 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 235, 249 (2002). 
68 See id.; Adam, supra note 55. 
69 See Charnovitz, supra note 20, at 355. 
380 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 31:371 
A. Intergovernmental Organizations vs. International NGOs 
 IOs are considerably different from international NGOs, primarily 
because they possess “legal personality,” which was first recognized in 
the Reparations Advisory Opinion.70 International NGOs can possess legal 
personality under domestic laws, but they cannot under public interna-
tional law.71 Thus, they are generally not considered to be full “sub-
jects” of international law.72 
 A distinguishing feature of IOs is that their existence is only attrib-
utable to the clear and express consent of the states that constitute 
them.73 In the Reparations Advisory Opinion, the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) held that the U.N. could bring suit on behalf of one of its 
agents.74 A central aspect of the ICJ’s reasoning in that case was that the 
U.N. was granted a certain measure of “personality” by its member na-
tions.75 The ICJ stated that it was important to attribute international 
legal personality to the U.N. because the U.N. Charter assigned the or-
ganization specific tasks, such as promotion of international economic, 
social, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation.76 The Reparations Advi-
sory Opinion, though somewhat controversial, set a clear precedent for 
the legal status of IOs.77 
 The legal status of international NGOs, however, is quite different 
from IOs.78 Unlike IOs, international NGOs are not created by treaties, 
but are the product of the cooperation of individuals.79 As one com-
mentator noted, “International NGOs are private organizations whose 
membership and support come from more than one country and 
whose political activities cross national borders. NGOs are thus distinct 
from supra-national and inter-governmental organizations, such as the 
World Trade Organization or the U.N., which are created by States.”80 
Thus, under the reasoning in the Reparation Advisory Opinion, interna-
                                                                                                                      
70 See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory 
Opinion (Reparation for Injuries), 1949 I.C.J. 174, 179 (Apr. 1949). 
71 Charnovitz, supra note 20, at 355. 
72 See Nowrot, supra note 17, at 635. One commentator has advanced the argument 
that international NGOs should be considered “partial subjects” of international law based 
on primary and secondary sources of international law. See id. 
73 See Janis, supra note 64, at 200, 201. 
74 See Reparation for Injuries, 1949 I.C.J. at 187. 
75 See id. at 179. 
76 Id. at 178–79. 
77 See id. at 187. 
78 See MacKenzie, supra note 17, at 210. 
79 See Janis, supra note 64, at 203; Charnovitz, supra note 20, at 352. 
80 Daniel C. Thomas, International NGOs, State Sovereignty, and Democratic Values, 2 Chi. 
J. Int’l L. 389, 390 (2001). 
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tional NGOs do not have international legal personality because they 
lack clear delegation from states via treaty.81 The individuals that make 
up an international NGO are committed to a collective purpose that 
arguably confers “moral authority” on the organization, but not “legal 
authority.”82 
 Another distinguishing characteristic between IOs and interna-
tional NGOs is their level of participation in international relations.83 
According to article 71 of the U.N. Charter, “The Economic and Social 
Council may make suitable arrangements for the consultation with 
non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters 
within its competence.”84 Article 71 thus creates a consultative relation-
ship with NGOs as opposed to giving them actual decision-making 
powers.85 Despite these limitations, NGOs do in fact make considerable 
contributions to the development of international law.86 For instance, 
NGOs can correct potential mistakes or logical inconsistencies in pro-
posals being considered for new conventions or treaties.87 As one 
scholar noted, “Besides mobilizing public pressure on governments 
and providing expert support for international lawmaking, NGOs are 
also starting direct personal appeals to . . . responsible decision-makers 
in international organizations as well as in national governments.”88 
B. International NGO Accountability Charter 
 The leaders of eleven prominent human rights and development 
international organizations created and endorsed the first international 
NGO Charter (Charter) in June 2006.89 The parties recognized that the 
non-profit sector was being increasingly scrutinized for their activities 
from both opponents and proponents of their work.90 The Charter seeks 
                                                                                                                      
81 See Reparation for Injuries, 1949 I.C.J. at 179; Janis, supra note 64, at 203. 
82 See Charnovitz, supra note 20, at 348. 
83 See U.N. Charter art. 71. 
84 Id. 
85 MacKenzie, supra note 17, at 211. 
86 See Nowrot, supra note 17, at 593. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 594–95. 
89 See Press Release, Oxfam Int’l, NGOs Lead by Example: World’s International NGOs 
Endorse Accountability Charter ( June 6, 2006), available at http://www.oxfam.org/en/ 
news/pressreleases2006/pr060606_ngo_charter [hereinafter NGOs Lead]. The charter 
was signed by ActionAid Int’l, Amnesty International, CIVICUS World Alliance for Citizen 
Participation, Consumers International, Greenpeace International, Oxfam International, 
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to “enhance transparency and accountability” by working toward four 
key stated goals.91 The Charter outlines issues surrounding the princi-
ples, governance, and fundraising activities of international NGOs.92 The 
framers of the Charter recognized that, in addition to national laws and 
regulations, international NGOs need to create standards that tran-
scend national boundaries.93 The signatories explicitly indicated their 
unique role in finding solutions to problems that governments are ei-
ther unable or unwilling to address on their own.94 Furthermore, the 
Charter recognizes the primary role of local governments by stating, 
“[International NGOs] can complement but not replace the over-
arching role and primary responsibility of governments to promote 
equitable human development and well-being . . . .”95 
 The Charter emphasizes that it is vital for international NGOs to 
maintain independence from governments and donors who may seek 
to influence their goals.96 The most express statement of independence 
found in the Charter stated, “We aim to be both politically and finan-
cially independent. Our governance, programmes and policies will be 
non-partisan, independent of specific governments, political parties 
and the business sector.”97 With respect to donors, the Charter states 
that: anonymity will be guaranteed except when the size of a donation 
would be relevant to an organization’s independence; and independ-
ence will be enhanced by recording and publishing major institutional 
gifts.98 
 The creation of the Charter was a bold gesture to show that 
NGOs are truly concerned with public trust and accountability; how-
ever, it lacks binding authority in international law.99 Because the in-
ternational NGOs that endorsed the Charter are not states, they can-
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not bind themselves by treaty.100 The document is therefore closer to 
a declaration rather than a binding agreement.101 
C. State Sovereignty: African Nations and Domestic Laws 
 International law is primarily concerned with the rights and duties 
of states because they remain the central actors in the international le-
gal system.102 A sovereign state is free to govern its own population in its 
own territory by enacting laws and regulations.103 It is therefore undis-
puted that international and local NGOs operating within African na-
tions are subject to the local laws of their host state.104 With the prolif-
eration of NGOs working in Africa, and mounting suspicion over their 
activities, certain African leaders have enacted repressive laws that sig-
nificantly limit the ability of NGOs to function within those nations.105 
1. Zimbabwe’s NGO Act and Ghana’s NGO Law 
 Zimbabwe enacted the highly controversial Non-Governmental 
Organizations Act (NGO Act) in 2004, which gave Zimbabwe’s gov-
ernment broad power to interfere with the operations of NGOs.106 Ac-
cording to the Act, all organizations that provided charity, relief, com-
munity development, or lobbying must register with the Governance 
Board (Board) as established by the NGO Act.107 One of the four stated 
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goals of the NGO Act is “to facilitate a constructive relationship be-
tween government and non-governmental organizations in order to 
advance the public good.”108 Despite this noble language, many inter-
national NGOs have publicly announced their outrage at the law.109 A 
representative of Amnesty International commented on the law’s po-
tential repercussions, stating, “If the NGO Act is enforced across the 
board, tens of thousands of people being assisted by NGO programs 
could suffer. . . . Most victims have nowhere else to turn in a country 
where unemployment is above seventy percent and health service has 
been seriously eroded.”110 Various aspects of the NGO Act are troubling 
to the international aid community.111 
 First, the law prevents local NGOs from receiving foreign fund-
ing.112 Because the majority of funding for local NGOs comes from for-
eign sources, the effect of the law is essentially to eliminate all NGO 
finances within Zimbabwe.113 Second, the Board is granted sweeping 
powers to regulate activities of NGOs that have registered with it.114 For 
example, o the Board has the power “to enforce the code of conduct 
for [NGOs] . . . and to ensure that [NGOs] act in the public interest in 
accordance with their objectives.”115 Similarly, the Board will be made 
up of government officials who will have interests aligned with those in 
power at the time.116 Human rights organizations are particularly con-
cerned that these expansive powers will be applied selectively, thus 
hurting organizations that “promote and protect human rights.”117 
 In 2004, Ghana began rigorously enforcing a domestic law that 
required local and international NGOs to provide adequate records or 
become “blacklisted” by the government.118 All blacklisted NGOs were 
made public and their names were given to potential local and foreign 
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donors.119 A government official demonstrated his pessimism toward 
NGOs when he said, “Most NGOs spent around 80% of the money 
available to them from government agencies or foreign sponsors as 
administrative costs, for which they do not render proper accounts.”120 
III. Analysis 
 There have been a variety of proposed solutions to address the 
problem of the relative weakness of NGOs compared to sovereign 
states.121 The most logical solution would be to grant international 
NGOs the level of international personality generally associated with 
IOs.122 Thus, it is argued, these organizations will be able to function 
with well-defined rights and obligations in the international legal sys-
tem.123 Furthermore, such a construction would be in accord with the 
many roles that international NGOs are currently playing in both in-
ternational development and advocacy.124 This system would recog-
nize the emergence of an “open system” in international law that ac-
knowledges many non-state actors and grants them clearly articulated 
rights and responsibilities.125 There are, however, a number of prob-
lems with this approach, both on a theoretical and a practical level.126 
These difficulties are of particular significance in the context of Afri-
can aid because granting international NGOs greater status could be 
seriously detrimental to their cause.127 As a result, a better solution 
would be to reinforce the existing international legal framework, al-
low NGOs to maintain their independence, and create more effective 
mechanisms to foster communication between international NGOs 
and host states.128 
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 First, by granting international NGOs status as full subjects of in-
ternational law, they would be deprived of their vital independence.129 
International NGOs receive nearly all of their funding from Western 
developed countries, and the volume of these funds is growing.130 This 
tends to reinforce the view that NGOs are “part and parcel of Western 
powers.”131 Further legitimization from governments and organizations 
viewed as being dominated by Western interests would therefore hurt 
rather than help the current relationship between international NGOs 
and the African governments where they operate.132 Enhanced inde-
pendence will allow the focus of health- and development-related aid 
groups to be on their humanitarian mission, and not the political in-
terests those NGOs are perceived to represent.133 The fact that there 
has been a significant increase in funding from private donors, such as 
the Gates Foundation, could increase the perception of independence 
possessed by international NGOs.134 Because these donors primarily 
come from the United States and Europe, however, they might still be 
seen as proponents of Western interests.135 
 A grant of legal personality to NGOs would run contrary to the 
reasoning of the Reparations Advisory Opinion.136 In that case, the ICJ 
held that the U.N. was a subject of international law that was capable of 
possessing rights and obligations.137 One of those rights was to bring 
international claims on behalf of its agents.138 On a fundamental level, 
the constituents of NGOs are “groups of persons or societies,” not sov-
ereign states.139 Even if international NGOs were to delegate to “organs 
special tasks,” it would still not confer any degree of international legal 
personality as articulated by the ICJ because their constituents are not 
states.140 Therefore, the reasoning in the Reparation Advisory Opinion 
breaks down when one tries to apply it to international NGOs.141 
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 Another important consideration when proposing that interna-
tional NGOs should possess greater legal status is the role played by the 
government where NGOs operate.142 International NGOs recognize 
that governments should not be ignored in the context of African aid 
delivery.143 In their proposed Charter, leaders of prominent interna-
tional NGOs stated, “INGOs can complement but not replace the over-
arching role and primary responsibility of governments to promote 
equitable human development and well being, to uphold human rights 
and to protect ecosystems.”144 This comment highlights the fact NGOs 
address problems faced by African governments that they are “unable 
or unwilling to address on their own.”145 It will be these governments, 
or their successors, that will ultimately be the ones to take on such chal-
lenges in the long-term.146 
 According to prominent economist Jeffrey Sachs, countries have to 
put aside misconceptions of massive corruption and continue to fund 
African governments to achieve development goals.147 Through the 
U.N. Millennium Project,148 Sachs argues that efforts should be made to 
work with African governments.149 In Kenya, for example, efforts should 
be made to “improve the functioning of public administration . . . , [in-
crease] job training, [grant] higher pay for senior managers so they do 
not have to live off bribes or side payments, [and offer] continued sup-
port for the government’s already major efforts to improve the judicial 
system . . . .”150 All of these recommendations are particularly insight-
ful—but often ignored—in the international NGO discussion.151 By 
starting with the assumption that all African governments are corrupt 
and ineffective, it is easier to focus on the status of NGOs in isolation.152 
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This neglects the reality that African governments must still be consid-
ered in the development equation.153 Therefore, the legal status of in-
ternational NGOs should be considered carefully in light of other con-
siderations that will shape the future of aid delivery in Africa.154 
 International NGOs can continue to put pressure on global policy 
changes by acting through already established legal regimes.155 In par-
ticular, NGOs should remain in consultation with the U.N. to bring 
about changes in international law as they are currently allowed to do 
under article 71 of the U.N. Charter.156 In this way, NGOs can play a 
prominent and important role in shaping the development of interna-
tional treaties and agreements.157 As an example of the influential role 
NGOs can play within this capacity, nearly 1400 NGOs officially partici-
pated at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992.158 In the context of develop-
ment- and health-related aid, NGOs can use their increased access to 
U.N. officials to lobby for change when they view an action taken by a 
state, such as the repressive NGO Law in Zimbabwe, as being a violation 
of basic human rights.159 According to one commentator, “In the hu-
man rights area, NGOs contribute to the political debate at the U.N. 
level by providing information on . . . human rights violations in differ-
ent countries.”160 Through these established legal mechanisms, inter-
national NGOs are able to put public pressure on governments and by 
doing so can influence the behavior of states.161 
 The Charter may be the best example of how communication can 
be enhanced between international NGOs and host governments.162 
Because international NGOs should not be afforded international legal 
personality, this document would not serve as a binding legal instru-
ment in international law.163 The Charter does, however, have signifi-
cant implications for shaping how governments and international 
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NGOs will co-exist in the future.164 For instance, the organizations that 
drafted the Charter emphasized similar themes throughout the docu-
ment, including independence, accountability, and transparency.165 In 
regard to transparency, the Charter states, “We are committed to open-
ness, transparency and honesty about our structures, mission, policies 
and activities. We will communicate actively with stakeholders about 
ourselves, and make information publicly available.”166 This statement 
showed a clear recognition that there is a problem of effective commu-
nication both between host states and those who have a stake in the 
international NGOs themselves.167 By clearly defining their mission, 
goals, and intentions, international NGOs can more effectively distance 
themselves from powerful donors.168 
 Similarly, local NGOs can adopt a comparable strategy, such as that 
proposed for international NGOs, to rebut the presumption that they 
lack professionalism and are prone to cronyism.169 The pessimism to-
ward some local NGOs was expressed by an official from Ghana: 
“NGOs are meant to be philanthropic, but many are fake and take a 
share of the money for their personal use.”170 Although there will al-
ways be groups who will try to exploit aid that comes from foreign do-
nors, as a whole, it would serve local NGOs well to let their govern-
ments know exactly how they are benefiting their community.171 By 
doing this, local NGOs can serve their vital role in furthering health- 
and development-related initiatives.172 Furthermore, greater levels of 
communication can foster a more unified structure of aid delivery and 
avoid duplication of resources.173 
 By not granting international NGOs full legal personality, it will 
certainly put them in a more precarious position relative to IOs.174 This 
status will, however, encourage international NGOs to collaborate with 
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governments, IOs, and other actors to achieve “shared objectives.”175 
When collaboration occurs, all of the actors engaged in African aid de-
livery can heed the U.N. call to form a “new humanitarian order” 
where states, NGO, and IOs cooperate with one another.176 In other 
words, NGOs should not be relied on to be the exclusive actors in Afri-
can aid delivery.177 By granting NGOs greater power relative to the na-
tion state, it will encourage NGOs and their donors to ignore the role 
of governments.178 This would be a serious mistake because African 
governments are the ones that must ultimately assume the burden of 
providing many services that NGOs currently offer.179 
 Finally, international NGOs can rely on their growing moral le-
gitimacy to counteract the powers of an uncooperative host state.180 
Moral legitimacy is greatest when the mission of international NGOs is 
defined in terms of alleviating poverty and promoting basic health.181 
Thus, when NGOs strive to attack the growing AIDS epidemic or stop 
the spread of malaria or tuberculosis, they are pursuing what many be-
lieve to be a moral duty.182 When a state consistently expels interna-
tional NGO field workers, such as the Doctors Without Borders per-
sonnel in Sudan, or threatens Oxfam, the international community can 
condemn such acts on moral grounds.183 
 To build genuine partnerships between IOs, international NGOs, 
and African governments, leaders of African nations must be commit-
ted to democratic governance.184 Indeed, many countries are moving 
closer toward liberalized political systems including Benin, Ghana, Na-
mibia, and Mali.185 On the other end of the spectrum, Zimbabwe has 
regressed politically under the rule of President Robert Mugabe.186 It is 
therefore not a surprise that one of the most repressive NGO laws is in 
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one of the most repressive African nations.187 In countries with the 
most genuinely corrupt leadership, such as Zimbabwe, leaders con-
stantly face the reality of “open revolt” from their citizens.188 In these 
extreme cases, the potential for genuine partnerships can only begin 
when there is a change in leadership.189 Ghana, however, is a moderate 
and well-governed nation that has legitimate concerns about local and 
international NGOs.190 In countries like Ghana, abandoning the as-
sumption that all African governments are corrupt, enhancing com-
munication between international NGOs and government officials, and 
recognizing the moral legitimacy of NGOs can truly advance the goals 
of health and development aid.191 
Conclusion 
 The efforts of international and domestic NGOs to provide aid to 
African countries would not be enhanced by recognizing that they pos-
sess international legal personality. At first glance, such a suggestion 
appears logically sound and would seemingly provide a needed check 
on problematic African governments. This solution, however, is con-
trary to the reasoning laid down by the ICJ in granting entities legal 
personality. This view could also compromise the vital independence 
on which international NGOs rely to be effective. Finally, by focusing 
on private actors, and ignoring the fundamental importance of the 
state, it could frustrate the long-term goal of aid delivery. Instead, a 
framework is needed that allows NGOs to be self-regulating and fosters 
a more collaborative working relationship between all types of actors in 
aid delivery. African governments can then be certain that interna-
tional NGOs are there to provide much needed assistance to their citi-
zens, and not simply to push the agenda of Western nations. Further-
more, NGOs will be able to pursue their important health and 
development goals without fearing negative repercussions. 
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